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Politics and Policy: ChineseMoney and
its Impact on the Regulation of
Residential Property in the West
Edward S.W. Ti*
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Introduction
The performance of housing and commercial property markets alike have a
profound effect on the social and economic wellbeing of cities.1 It is thus not
uncommon for policy-makers to intervene to influence the property market,
producing “household and business location decisions, property development and
investment strategies all shaped directly or indirectly by a myriad of policy
initiatives”.2 Indeed, the place-specific nature of real estate means that its economic
value is ultimately dependent on policy processes.3 Lord Wilson observes that the
word “policy” is often imprecise and usually used loosely, and can range from an
indication of an overall objective or a guiding principle or a specific action which
will be taken to help reach an objective.4 He defines policy as the “actions,
objectives and pronouncements of governments … and the steps they take to
implement them…”.5 Guided by this articulation, this paper discusses the policies
meant to address the “emerging global trend of foreign liquidity in local property
markets”.6 In particular, this paper focuses on a significant segment of this
trend—the impact of Chinese nationals7 buying property in the West8 and what
legislative response has emerged in the markets in question.
This paper’s thesis argues that some of the policy reactions by the jurisdictions
analysed may not have resulted because Chinese investors have been proved to
*Assistant Professor of Law, Singapore Management University, PhD (Cantab). I am grateful to Professor Adam
Hofri-Winogradow for reading an earlier draft; all errors remain mine.
1D. Adams, C. Watkins and M.White (eds), “Examining Public Policy and Property Markets” in Planning, Public
Policy & Property Markets (Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 3.
2D. Adams, C. Watkins and M.White (eds), “Examining Public Policy and Property Markets” in Planning, Public
Policy & Property Markets (Blackwell Publishing, 2005).
3D. Adams, C. Watkins and M.White (eds), “Examining Public Policy and Property Markets” in Planning, Public
Policy & Property Markets (Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 239.
4R.Wilson, “Policy Analysis as Policy Advice” inM.Moran, M. Rein and R. Goodin (eds), The Oxford Handbook
of Public Policy (OUP, 2008), 153.
5R.Wilson, “Policy Analysis as Policy Advice” inM.Moran, M. Rein and R. Goodin (eds), The Oxford Handbook
of Public Policy (OUP, 2008), 154.
6A. Bardhan and C. Kroll, “Globalization and the Real Estate Industry: Issues, Implications, Opportunities” (Sloan
Industry Studies Annual Conference, Cambridge, MA, 26 April 2007) at http://web.mit.edu/sis07/www/kroll.pdf
[Accessed 14 November 2019].
7Chinese nationals include not just mainland Chinese but also those from Greater China (especially Hong Kong
SAR). Other Asian buyers residing outside China, as well as the Chinese diaspora in Asia (e.g. Singapore, Malaysia
and other parts of Southeast Asia) also invest in the West but are not included as “Chinese buyers” for the purpose
of this paper as references by governments to “Chinese buyers” typically refer to the former.
8The paper is limited to cities in Australia, New Zealand and Canada as these jurisdictions appear to have enacted
policies that were expressly directed at moderating the effects of Chinese investing in residential real estate.
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have increased residential prices to an extent affecting affordability. Some of the
evidence instead suggests that such policies have been adopted to appease the
feelings of the local population who believe that Chinese investors are the root of
the problem. This is a significant enquiry because it is an issue that traverses both
property rights and ethnocentrism. Singling out or blaming a particular nationality
(one that is so closely linked to ethnicity)9 for something as sensitive as housing
may be controversial if there is no data or proof in support. Majoritarian belief
that a certain “group” is to be blamed for a social ill is a dangerous, slippery slope.
Many of the jurisdictions analysed in this paper have significant ethnic Chinese
communities. While the political statements mentioned by the lawmakers roundly
clarify that Chinese nationals cause high prices, it would be surprising if ethnic
Chinese communities would be wholly unaffected if strong anti-Chinese national
sentiment took root. In Australia, Rogers & Dufty-Jones have observed that the
singling out of buyers of Chinese heritage can lead to cultural profiling of people
of Asian appearance who buy property. They note that the labelling of
Australian-Chinese (i.e. Australian citizens) as Chinese investors (i.e. foreign
nationals) is a conceptual problem which “feeds parochial discourses in the public
debate”.10 Similarly in Vancouver, Ley &Murphy’s scholarship demonstrated that
in the early 2000s the cultural profiling and misrepresentation of local Chinese
communities in Vancouver’s mainstream media reinforced negative stereotypes
of these migrant groups in Canada.11
A few clarifications about the scope of the paper are in order. First, in the absence
of case law, this paper relies on Hansard parliamentary debates, statutes,
government publications and academic journals and textbooks as researchmaterial.
Because the academic literature is limited, this paper also relies on secondary
sources such as newspaper periodicals and commercial research publications.
Collectively, I use this mosaic of information to critically analyse the
implementation of housing policy in reaction to the impact Chinese money has
had on residential property in the analysed jurisdictions. Secondly, I am not
challenging the underlying presumption that “locals” (however so defined) should
be granted the highest opportunities to buy property. Thirdly, my analysis whether
the presence of Asian buyers becoming a legitimate political issue is justified or
merely a convenient excuse for “political hysteria”12 is qualitative. Where data is
referred to, I explicitly rely on the quantitative analysis done by others. Fourthly,
this paper is not looking at the effects of Chinese buyers in non-western
jurisdictions. Foreign buyers, including Chinese investors are buying property
around the globe, including in many non-Western jurisdictions. Indeed, Hong
Kong SAR,Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines all have lawsmeant
to limit foreign home buyers, of which Chinese investors comprise a significant
segment. Indeed, “anti-Chinese” sentiment in those jurisdictions may even be more
intense than those in the West. Fifthly, this paper limits itself to the effect Chinese
buyers have, or are said to have, on direct investments in residential property,
9China is ethnically homogeneous with ~92% Han Chinese.
10D. Rogers and R. Dufty-Jones (eds), “21st Century Australian Housing: New Frontiers in the Asia Pacific” in
Housing in Twenty-First Century Australia: People, Practices and Policies (Routledge, 2016), 221–236.
11D. Ley and P. Murphy, “Immigration in gateway cities: Sydney and Vancouver in comparative perspective”
(2001) 55(3) Progress in Planning 119, 165.
12N. Miller, M. Sklarz and N. Ordway, “Japanese Purchases, Exchange Rates and Speculation in Residential Real
Estate Markets” (1988) 3(3) Journal of Real Estate Research 39, 48.
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which typically engenders far stronger sentiment than commercial property and
is thus the focus of policy making vis-à-vis foreign buyers. Sixthly and finally,
my focus is not on general macroprudential measures which aim to reduce
speculation in property per se, but which are not specifically aimed at reducing
demand from foreign buyers. While reducing demand from foreign buyers’ will
have the concurrent effect of reducing demand in the market in general, this paper
focuses on the changes to the lawwhich have taken place with the expressed intent
as a response to foreign, and in particular, Chinese buyers.
Using the legislative reactions to Chinese money in six western jurisdictions:
Australia (Victoria, New South Wales & Queensland), New Zealand and Canada
(Ontario & British Columbia), this comparative exercise seeks to identify the
policy rationale behind the law and analyse its propriety.
Chinese motivations for buying in the West and some attendant
effects
There are a multitude of reasons why Chinese nationals are motivated to buy
residential property in the West. Endogenous reasons could include an increase in
disposable savings coupled with the lack of appealing investment opportunities at
home. The continuing rise in Chinese wealth eclipses the similar trajectory enjoyed
by the Japanese in the 1980s. A paper from that era explains that the rise in Japanese
wealth and the strengthening of the Japanese Yen resulted in Japanese buyers
motivated by the comparative value they enjoyed (per square foot of housing in
Tokyo versus Honolulu) and as a result were attracted to make property purchases
in Hawaii.13 Similarly, housing prices in China have also risen significantly.
Relatively speaking therefore, buying in the “West” may not be as expensive.
Exogenous reasons may include the desire to send children to study abroad,
future preparations for possible immigration, attractiveness of a transparent property
market, exposure to safe haven currencies and belief in the inherent strength of
Western economies, as well as diversification benefits.14 One commentator has
also suggested that Canada’s agreeable environment may have been a pull factor.
According to the Chairman of the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, John Bruk,
“members of China’s middle class, who have lot of money to spare and who are
living in overcrowded and polluted cities, are looking for a more pleasant
environment for themselves or their children”.15 In the context of Australia, its
low-risk business environment, educational opportunities, lifestyle and large ethnic
Chinese population have been said to make the country an attractive destination
for buyers from China.16
Foreign buyers (being foreign) will not assimilate as well as locals. Their money
is made outside the country and is brought in to compete with locals for residential
housing within a particular locale. Depending on the reason of the purchase, the
13N. Miller, M. Sklarz and N. Ordway, “Japanese Purchases, Exchange Rates and Speculation in Residential Real
Estate Markets” (1988) 3(3) Journal of Real Estate Research 39, 40.
14C. Sirmans and E.Worzala, “International direct real estate investment: A review of the literature” (2003) 40(5–6)
Urban Studies 1081, 114.
15 J. Bruk, Canada’s housing crisis: The time for study has passed, The Globe and Mail 8 July 2016 at https://www
.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/rob-commentary/canadas-housing-crisis-the-time-for-study-has-passed
/article30801183/ [Accessed 14 November 2019].
16 Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975 (No.92 1975).
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foreign buyers may keep their properties largely empty, adding to the frustration
of local residents. These are some of the postulations that may be justified in some
cases but pure politics in others. For instance, Miller, Sklarz & Ordway note that
Japanese buyers were singled out as the main cause of the rapid housing price
appreciation in parts of Hawaii in the 1980s. Their analysis, however, rejects any
causation, concluding instead that price increases weremore a symptom of Hawaii’s
long-evolving housing shortfall: rapidly growing populations and severely
restrictive land use controls were driving up average home prices long before the
Japanese took an interest in Hawaii.17 Conversely, a recent paper analysing the
Vancouver residential market indicates a strong correlation between foreign
ownership and unaffordability.18
What have host countries done?19
The jurisdictions discussed below have all enacted laws guided by their policy
beliefs that the free market has failed and some degree of control of the local
residential market is needed. Affordability is typically the policy goal cited but
how this is achieved may not necessarily coincide with the response that voters
may want implemented. As governments come in and out of power, differing
mindsets or agendas might permeate, with sentiments amorphous and disparate.
Yet the enactment of legislation is supposed to be a technical expression of this
sentiment. What follows are a breakdown by jurisdiction of the measures and
legislation implemented in response to Chinese buyers, and some comparative
observations before concluding.
Australia
Foreign ownership of residential property in Australia has sometimes been described
as an emotionally charged issue with locals pointing the fingers at foreign buyers
when property prices increase in Australia’s capital cities. Indeed
“foreigners-make-housing-expensive” was a central economic tenet of the Abbott
Government. This has been described as a political gambit designed to play to the
assumed xenophobic instincts of the electorate.20 Unfortunately, some of this
“assumed xenophobia”, particularly against the Chinese, appears true. In 2014,
well-knownAustralian businessman and politician Clive Palmer said in the context
of an iron ore dispute in Western Australia, “I don’t mind standing up against the
Chinese bastards and stopping them from (taking over)”.21 Recently, Jason Clare
(Labour) recently noted the inherent tension between the importance of foreign
17N. Miller, M. Sklarz and N. Ordway, “Japanese Purchases, Exchange Rates and Speculation in Residential Real
Estate Markets” (1988) 3(3) Journal of Real Estate Research 39.
18 J. Gordon, Vancouver’s Housing Affordability Crisis: Causes, Consequences and Solutions Centre for Public
Policy Research, Simon Fraser University 2 May 2016 at http://www.sfu.ca/mpp/centre_for_public_policy_research
/cppr.html [Accessed 14 November 2019].
19See Appendix for an overview of what regulatory reactions some jurisdictions have done to moderate the effects
of foreign investors.
20C. Berg, “You can’t blame foreigners for high house prices” ABC News 17 February 2015 at https://www.abc
.net.au/news/2015-02-17/berg-you-cant-blame-foreigners-for-high-house-prices/6125500 [Accessed 14 November
2019].
21 P. Coorey and J. Heath, “Chinese bastards’ want to take over Australia: Palmer” [2014] Australian Financial
Review at https://www.afr.com/news/politics/national/chinese-bastards-want-to-take-over-australia-palmer-20140819
-j8vpx [Accessed 14 November 2019].
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investment and the lack of its popularity, particularly in respect of Chinese
investment. Addressing the House in August 2018, the five-time Federal MP
observed that Australia is a country built on foreign investment. He noted that
even though China is only the overall 9th biggest foreign investor, increase in
community concern was disproportionately higher compared to other inbound
nations (such as the US). 72% of Australians polled in the Lowy Institute Poll
2017 agreed that “the government was allowing toomuch investment fromChina”.22
It remains to be seen whether his exhortation will be followed:
“We’ve got to talk up the benefits of foreign investment, but we also can’t
ignore community concerns, because if we do they fester, they get worse and
it makes it harder to do the things that we think are so important to create the
country we want to build.”23
As discussed below, a goodmajority of foreign investors in Australia are Chinese
nationals. There is doubt, however, whether concerns about affordability are
proportional to the actual effect Chinese investors have had on residential property
in Australia. Guest & Rohde24 find that increases in foreign investment have
accounted for 20–30% of the housing prices between 2004–2014 in Melbourne
and Sydney (while leading to lower prices in Brisbane and Perth). In contrast, a
paper by the Australian Treasury25 has expressed the view that the recent price
growth experienced in Australia is largely not attributable to foreign demand. The
Treasury Paper notes the research by Guest &Rohde but disagrees with its findings.
The Treasury expresses the view that its research had the benefit of far more
granular data (monthly FIRB approvals at the postcode level), while Guest &
Rodhe’s paper was limited to annual and State level data. The Treasury paper notes
that foreign investors account for an increasing share of demand for residential
property, with approximately 70% of FIRB approvals made by Chinese national
applicants. However, it concludes that there is only a small positive relationship
(less than 1%) between foreign investment approvals and residential property price
growth. Additionally, the Treasury’s research found that foreign demand has been
successful in achieving the national policy of increasing supply of housing—more
developers were incentivised to construct new dwellings to satisfy the increasing
demand from foreigners, who are limited to buying new properties.
Chung has noted that there is very little research on the impact of buyers with
Chinese backgrounds on the Australian property market, and most of the negative
commentary on the Chinese was “based on media and real estate agent
speculation”.26 Her research indicates that there is inconclusive evidence whether
Chinese investment has resulted in higher home prices. In respect of Australia’s
22 J. ClareMP,Ministerial Statements—Investment Statement 2018 (Hansard, House of Representatives, 20 August
2018) at https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Hansard/Hansard_Display?bid=chamber/hansardr
/66d5616d-41f7-432b-b370-a62012124e44/&sid=0194 [Accessed 14 November 2019].
23 J. ClareMP,Ministerial Statements—Investment Statement 2018 (Hansard, House of Representatives, 20 August
2018).
24R. Guest and N. Rohde, “The Contribution of Foreign Real Estate Investment to Housing Price Growth in
Australian Capital Cities” (2017) 53(3) ABACUS 304.
25C. Wokker and J. Swieringa, “Foreign Investment and Residential Property Price Growth” (Treasury Working
Paper, December 2016) at https://www.rse.anu.edu.au/media/1845323/Swieringa-Paper-2017.pdf [Accessed 14
November 2019].
26M. Chung, “New Research questions impact of Chinese buyers on Australian House Prices” (Deakin University
media release, 18 September 2017) at https://www.deakin.edu.au/about-deakin/media-releases/articles/new-research
-questions-impact-of-chinese-buyers-on-australian-house-prices [Accessed 14 November 2019].
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Business Innovation and Investment visa program (which starts at A$1.5M worth
of investment and goes up to A$15M), Chung states that 90% of applicants from
that program in 2014–2015 were Chinese. She proffers the view that the rapid
prominence of the Chinese in Australia may have attracted envy by some
Australians who in response have made Chinese scapegoats for high housing
prices.
Australia’s Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB)
From a legal perspective, the regulation of foreign27 investment into Australian
residential property is administered by the Foreign Investment Review Board
(FIRB), a non-statutory body established in 1976 to advise the Federal Treasurer
and the Government on foreign investment matters. Technically, the FIRB has
only advisory functions and cannot make binding decisions on foreign investment
for the government. Under the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975 (the
Act)28Pt 3, the Treasurer is responsible for making decisions on foreign investment
policy and investment proposals. In practice though, FIRB officers are empowered
to make decisions “consistent with the foreign investor framework”,29 with the
FIRB being described as a “de facto part of the Treasury”.30 Policy advisers in the
Central Bank believe that an increase in the level of demand for new housing will
lead to an increase in housing supply.31 In furtherance of this policy, foreign
investors are prohibited from purchasing “established dwellings”32 under s.95(4)
of the Act, unless able to get an exemption certificate under s.37. In practice,
virtually all foreign investors are limited to purchasing newly built or off-plan
dwellings. There is data suggesting that first home buyers (Australian
nationals/residents) generally purchase established rather than new dwellings.33
This may suggest that limiting foreign buyers to new dwellings is complementary.
Even in respect of new dwellings, s.3 of the Act states that the Treasurer, in
relation to a foreigner intending to acquire real estate, is entitled to:
• decide that the Commonwealth has no objection;
• impose conditions on the purchase;
• prohibit the purchase; or
• require the action to be undone (e.g. requiring the disposal of an
interest that has been acquired).
In practice, the vast majority of applications for new dwellings are approved
(with the condition of the application fee paid); the approach at the federal (FIRB)
level is to charge an application fee which entitles the foreign investor to make
27A “foreign person” refers to all individuals “not ordinarily resident” in Australia (Foreign Acquisitions and
Takeovers Act 1975 (No.92 1975) s.4).
28 Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975 (No.92 1975).
29 Foreign Investment Review Board, Annual Report 2017–2018 (February 2019), 3.
30C. Paris, “The Super-Rich and Transnational HousingMarkets: Asians Buying Australian Housing” in R. Forrest,
S. Yee Koh and B. Wissink (eds), Cities and the Super-Rich: Real Estate, Elite Practices and Urban Political
Economies (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 63, 71.
31M. Gauder, C. Houssard and D. Orsmond, “Foreign Investment in Residential Real Estate” [2014] Reserve Bank
Bulletin 15.
32Defined as simply “not new dwellings” under the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975 (No.92 1975)
s.4.
33M. Gauder, C. Houssard and D. Orsmond, “Foreign Investment in Residential Real Estate” [2014] Reserve Bank
Bulletin 16.
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the investment sought. Every purchase by a foreigner requires separate FIRB
approval and consequently separate fees. The Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers
Fees Imposition Act 201534Pt 2 sets out the application fee applicable—the fees
are commensurate to the intended value of the purchase sought, ranging from
A$5700 for purchases below A$1M to A$104,100 for purchases valued between
A$9–A$10M, with even higher rates applicable for properties worth more than
A$10M.
While Chinese nationals are today a very significant segment of inbound foreign
investors to Australia,35 “China was an isolated communist state”36 when FIRB
was established in 1976. It should also be recalled that the meteoric growth
experienced by China starting from the 1990s was also a crucial factor in Australia’s
own prosperity, especially through demand for minerals and other resources. The
Federal Government’s white paper Australia in the Asian Century37 notes that the
Australian economy and society have progressively become more integrated into
the Asia-Pacific region. The white paper also notes that by 2025, Asia-Pacific will
account for half of the world’s output. The inherent policy tensions in respect of
dealing with Chinese money has led to FIRB taking a fairly robust attitude towards
foreign investment. For instance, Liberal MP Kelly O’Dwyer lamented in the
House of Representatives that since 2006, there has not been a single prosecution
against foreign investors who failed to comply with FIRB notifications.38 The
Reserve Bank has stated that “foreign investment has been a longstanding feature
of Australia’s housing market”.39
It should be noted that the FIRB fees only give the foreign investor the right to
purchase housing in Australia and foreign investors are subject to enhanced taxation
at the State level as well. All six States40 in Australia now impose additional
acquisition taxes for foreign-investors. Of these, three States, and in particular
their major cities—Victoria (Melbourne), New South Wales (Sydney) and
Queensland (Brisbane) attract more than 90% of Chinese money coming into
Australia.41 This paper thus focuses on these three States. Tevfik & Liu note that
according to Australian State government statistics in 2015–2016, 25% of new
dwellings in NSW (under FIRB foreigners are limited to buying new dwellings)
are acquired by foreigners, of which 80% are Chinese nationals. In Victoria, 16%
34 Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Fees Imposition Act 2015 (No.152 2015).
35China is now the second largest foreign investor source country in Australia, behind the US. However, while
only 17% of US investment in Australia is in real estate, 54% of inbound Chinese capital is placed in property: Foreign
Investment Review Board, Annual Report 2017–2018 (February 2019), 1.
36C. Paris, “The Super-Rich and Transnational HousingMarkets: Asians Buying Australian Housing” in R. Forrest,
S. Yee Koh and B. Wissink (eds), Cities and the Super-Rich: Real Estate, Elite Practices and Urban Political
Economies (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 63, 71.
37Australian commonwealth government (2012) 6.
38K.O’DwyerMP,Matters of Public Importance—PrimeMinister (Hansard, House of Representatives, 4 December
2014) at https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Hansard/Hansard_Display?bid=chamber/hansardr/200bef5f
-bafa-4738-b150-7dbac05c37e0/&sid=0147 [Accessed 14 November 2019].
39M. Gauder, C. Houssard and D. Orsmond, “Foreign Investment in Residential Real Estate” [2014] Reserve Bank
Bulletin 18.
40Victoria: 8% pursuant to the Duties Act 2000 (w.e.f. 1 July 2019); New South Wales: 8% pursuant to the Duties
Act 1997 (w.e.f. 1 July 2017); Western Australia: 7% pursuant to the Duties Act 2008 (w.e.f. 1 January 2019); South
Australia: 7% pursuant to the Stamp Duties Act 1923 (w.e.f. 1 January 2018); Queensland: 7% pursuant to the Duties
Act 2001 (w.e.f. 1 October 2016); and Tasmania: 3% pursuant to the Duties Act 2001 (w.e.f. 1 July 2018). Only the
territories (Northern Territory and Australian Capital Territory) do not.
41C. Tincknell,Duties Amendment (Additional Duty for Foreign Persons) Bill 2018 (Second Reading), Parliamentary
Debates (WA) Hansard (20 September 2018) at http://www.parliament.wa.gov.au/Hansard/hansard.nsf/0
/48B47D6FA0BDEA2B482583130017613C/$file/C40%20S1%2020180920%20All.pdf [Accessed 14 November
2019].
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of new dwellings are acquired by foreigners.42 These statistics are compelling but
must be looked at in the context of the entire property market. For instance, in
their submission to Australia’s Parliament,43 a non-profit organisation representing
Australia’s property developers (“NPO”) said that based on FIRB and data from
the Australian Bureau of Statistics, Chinese contribution of the total foreign
investment in residential real estate from 2010–2013 was approximately A$5
billion per annum, in a market worth A$250 billion. The NPO expressed the view
that:
“while 2% of the market is a worthy contribution to new housing, it is not
considered to be at a level to warrant the community concerns and intense
media scrutiny of late.”
TheNPO also indicated that with American and Canadian investment in Australia
at levels very close to the Chinese, the focus on Chinese investment was similarly
not warranted. Thus, it should be recalled that because foreigners are legally limited
to purchasing only new dwellings, a high proportion of Chinese buying such new
property may not necessarily have a large impact on the larger housing market,
which comprises both new dwellings and resale homes.
What follows is a brief discussion on the three States most affected by Chinese
buyers—Victoria, New South Wales and Queensland. Outside these States, the
impact of Chinese investors is certainly more muted. Hansard parliamentary
debates involving the enactment of the relevant additional tax for foreigners in
South Australia,44 Tasmania and Western Australia do not single out Chinese
investors as a cause for housing affordability in their respective States. The length
of the sections reflect the differing degrees of research and commentary in the
respective States.
Victoria
As of July 2019, Victoria has increased its additional foreign buyer’s stamp duty
for residential property to 8%.45 With its base stamp duty rate of 5.5%,46 foreigners
pay 13.5% transaction tax at the State level. As mentioned above (from 2015/2016
statistics), 16% of new dwellings are acquired by foreigners. While there is no
specific data what proportion of this is fuelled by Chinese buyers, there is certainly
evidence that curbing Chinese investors coming into the state remains a political
issue. During the legislative assembly debates on the amendment of the Duties
Act, Judith Graley MP (Labour & state government) said, “if you go out and talk
42H. Tevfik and P. Liu, Australian Investment Strategy: Shanghai? Shenzhen? Sydney! (Credit Suisse Research
Note,March 2017) at https://www.businessinsider.com.au/foreign-investment-in-australian-housing-2017-3 [Accessed
14 November 2019].
43At the request of the House of Representatives (Standing Committee on Economics), in contribution to Parliament’s
Report on Foreign Investment in Residential Real Estate (November 2014).
44Notably, in South Australia’s Hansard report, there were numerous comments on the impact of Chinese investment
in the State, but in relation to farming or commercial real estate. See, e.g. Ann Bressington’s quotation of Senator
Barnaby Joyce in the South Australian Parliament: “Well, you know, it’s sort of a bit like this: the Chinese have got
more guns than we’ve got, and they’ve got bigger guns than we’ve got, and if we are going to kick their arse—excuse
the language—they’re going to kick ours 10 times harder”. That is a very concerning statement for a senator to make,
given that this was an evening where he was addressing food producers. For him to say that we are fast becoming a
foreign-owned country is very disturbing. (18 July 2012) at http://hansardpublic.parliament.sa.gov.au/Pages
/HansardResult.aspx#/docid/HANSARD-10-11952 [Accessed 14 November 2019].
45Duties Act 2000 s.28A.
46Duties Act 2000 s.28, for properties more than A$960,000.
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to people in the community you will hear the average Australian saying that it is
a good thing to tax Chinese investors on property. That is a good thing. People
support that”.47 There was no other justification offered in support of the proposed
amendment of the Act. Absentee land tax has also increased to from 1.5% to 2%
in Victoria.48
New South Wales
Like Victoria, New South Wales also imposes an 8% additional “surcharge
purchaser’s duty” for residential property acquired by foreigners.49 Also similar
to Victoria, NSW imposes a base transfer tax of 5.5%50 meaning that foreigners
pay 13.5% transaction tax to the NSW government. Further, with effect from 31
December 2017, the State also enhanced its “surcharge land tax” for foreign-owned
residential property to 2% per annum.51 This is markedly different from Victoria’s
absentee land tax52 (which applies for unused properties regardless who owns
them).
As mentioned above, the data in respect of Chinese buyers in the State appears
compelling; approximately 20% of new dwellings in 2015/2016 were purchased
by Chinese nationals who comprise 80% of all foreign buyers.53 However, as
explained above, this statistic may not evidence a cause of housing unaffordability
as Chinese buyers cannot directly affect the secondary market.
It is also incongruous that a NSW legislator should refer to statistics in the
country to support legislative change for addressing the problem of housing
affordability within the State. In his speech to the Upper House of NSW in
November 2017, Lou Amato (Liberal) said:
“… in recent times the Australian housing market has seen exponential price
increases far exceeding the potential of most Australians to service…Unlike
our sometimes novel discussions on the cause, New Zealand has identified
the main culprit without engaging in a pseudointellectual debate on the issue.
The problem it seems is that foreign buyers are pushing up house prices and
restricting New Zealanders’ access to the market. Presently one in four
properties sold in our country is being purchased by foreign buyers who
consistently outbid Australians. It is obvious there is a correlation with
spiralling property prices and foreign investors bidding up prices way beyond
market value.”54
As a State legislator, Amato should arguably have confined himself with evidence
and data of the State; the parliamentarian’s dramatic conclusion of an obvious
47 J. Graley, State Taxation Acts Amendment Bill, Parliamentary Debates (Vic) Hansard (22 May 2018) 1484 at
https://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/images/stories/daily-hansard/Assembly_2018/Assembly_Daily_Extract_Tuesday
_22_May_2018_from_Book_6.pdf [Accessed 4 November 2019].
48Land Tax Act 2005 Pt 3.
49Duties Act 1997 s.104U.
50Duties Act 1997 s.32 (for properties above A$1,013,000).
51Land Tax Act 1956 s.5A(2).
52Land Tax Act 2005 Pt 3.
53H. Tevfik and P. Liu, Australian Investment Strategy: Shanghai? Shenzhen? Sydney! (Credit Suisse Research
Note, March 2017).
54L. Amato, Housing Affordability, Legislative Council Hansard (21 November 2017) at https://www.parliament
.nsw.gov.au/Hansard/Pages/HansardResult.aspx#/docid/HANSARD-1820781676-75074 [Accessed 14 November
2019].
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correlation between “spiralling property prices and foreign investors bidding up
prices way beyond market value” is also not persuasive, perhaps betraying
politicisation of the housing issue. Worse, the statistic that Amato cited grossly
misrepresents. In fact, one in four new properties were purchased by foreign buyers,
with most property transactions occurring in the secondary market.
In the literature, there is at least one paper that concerns itself on public sentiment
regarding the unpopularity of Chinese investors in NSW. Rogers,Wong&Nelson55
surveyed 899 Sydney residents, looking at their perceptions of foreign and Chinese
investment. They found high levels of public concern and discontent about foreign
investment amongst Sydneysiders, with Chinese investors being a key target of
this discontent. In the context of high housing prices in Sydney, there were widely
held concerns about housing affordability. According to the researchers, survey
respondents had a sophisticated understanding of what influences house prices,
but overemphasised the role of foreign investment. They found a general lack of
support for policy that encourages foreign investment, and a lack of confidence
in how the government is regulating foreign investment. The paper found that half
of the participants reported that theywould not welcomeChinese foreign investment
in their suburb.
Queensland
On top of its marginal transfer duty rate of 5.75%,56 Queensland has imposed an
“additional foreigner acquirer duty” of 7% under the Duties Act 2001 s.244. This
means that the State imposes a total transfer tax of 12.75% on foreigners.
It is interesting to note that during the parliamentary debates regarding the
imposition of the additional tax for foreign buyers, Queensland’s Premier
Annastacia Palaszczuk said that one of the purposes of the tax was to increase
funding of the home owner’s grant (from A$15,000 to A$20,000).57 Queensland
Treasurer Curtis Pitt similarly said that the tax would be to “make foreigners pay
for the infrastructure and services they will use”.58 A further justification for the
additional tax was simply that New SouthWales and Victoria had imposed similar
taxes.59 The position of the Queensland government is thus to treat the additional
foreigner acquirer duty as a wealth tax which allows the State to redistribute to
first time home owners who need help.
Laudably, there has been no indication by any Queensland legislator that the
purpose of the additional tax was to curtail foreign or Chinese investment so as to
increase affordability. This is despite a recent newspaper report60 indicating that
55D. Rogers, A.Wong and J. Nelson, “Public perceptions of Foreign and Chinese real estate investment: intercultural
relations in Global Sydney” (2017) 48(4) Australian Geographer 437–455.
56Duties Act 2001 Sch.3 (for properties above A$1M).
57A. Palaszczuk, Questions without notice (Hansard, Queensland Parliamentary Debates) 3204 (31 August 2016)
at https://www.parliament.qld.gov.au/documents/hansard/2016/2016_08_31_WEEKLY.pdf [Accessed 14 November
2019].
58C. Pitt,Questions without notice (Hansard, Queensland Parliamentary Debates) 3205 (31 August 2016) at https:
//www.parliament.qld.gov.au/documents/hansard/2016/2016_08_31_WEEKLY.pdf [Accessed 14 November 2019].
59A. Palaszczuk,Questions without notice (Hansard, Queensland Parliamentary Debates) 3845 (13 October 2016)
at https://www.parliament.qld.gov.au/documents/hansard/2016/2016_10_13_WEEKLY.pdf [Accessed 14 November
2019].
60K. Silva and K. McKechnie, “Chinese property investment soars in Qld as record number of uni students enrol”
ABC News, 25 June 2018 at https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-06-25/chinese-property-investment-soars-in-south
-east-queensland/9905558 [Accessed 14 November 2019].
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Chinese property investment have risen in tandemwith a record number of students
of Chinese nationality enrolling in universities in Queensland. The report notes
that data fromQueensland’s ForeignOwnership of Land Register show that Chinese
investors spent about A$1.5b on Queensland properties in 2016–17, up from $872
million two years earlier and that nearly all the money was spent on properties in
the Brisbane and Gold Coast area.
New Zealand
New Zealand probably has the most austere legislative response to foreign buyers
of residential property in the western world. On 15 August 2018, by a bare 63–57
majority, the newly formed labour-led Coalition Government passed the Overseas
Investment Amendment Bill which bans virtually all foreign investors from
purchasing residential property. Under the revised provisions, which came into
force on 22 October 2018, the Overseas Investment Act 2005 Sch.1,61 defines
residential property as “sensitive land”. Under cl.4 to Sch.2 of the Act, only
“qualifying individuals” are permitted to acquire such properties (barring
extraordinary ministerial approval). These include New Zealand nationals and
permanent residents, as well as due to free trade agreement reasons, citizens and
permanent residents of Australia and Singapore.62 Residential tenancies of up to
five-years are exempted from the prohibition against foreign acquisition.63
Foreigners are also permitted to purchase up to 60% of new strata units which
must be sold off-plan by developers constructing at least 20 new dwellings;
foreigners are not permitted to buy already built units.64 Somewhat similar to the
position in Australia, this exception aims to increase the number of new dwellings
introduced to the market. Enforcement under the Act is robust, and includes
allowing the Government to issue a “notice requiring a disposal of property” to a
non-qualifying person who has acquired sensitive land.65 Interestingly, there is no
stamp duty in New Zealand.
An appreciation of the politicking behind this recent amendment provides the
context behind the rule change. The key event was New Zealand’s 2017 general
elections and amajor campaign issue for all political parties was the fact of reported
severe housing unaffordability in several major cities in New Zealand. While both
the Labour Party (46) and New Zealand First (9) won less seats than New Zealand
National (56), the former two parties succeeded in forming government in New
Zealand’s 120-seat house through a coalition agreement with the Green Party (8).
With respect, both Labour and New Zealand First had run a tried-and-tested recipe:
blame foreigners for house price rises; both parties made election promises to
restrict investment by foreigners.
Labour Minister for Trade David Parker who introduced the Bill to the House,
said during the first reading, “We think that it is the birthright of New Zealanders
61Overseas Investment Act 2005 (No.82 of 2005).
62 Pursuant to the Overseas Investment Act 2005 (No.82 of 2005) Sch.2 cl.4 read with the Overseas Investment
Regulations 2005 (SR 2005/220) r.30.
63Overseas Investment Act 2005 (No.82 of 2005) Sch.3 cl.3.
64Overseas Investment Act 2005 (No.82 of 2005) Sch.3 cl.4 read with the Overseas Investment Regulations 2005
(SR 2005/220) r.32.
65Overseas Investment Act 2005 (No.82 of 2005) s.41F.
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to own our homes”.66 The Bill was also not saved by any hard data or evidence
showing how this extreme move to ban foreigners would result in improving
affordability. Instead, Parker appeared to rely on vague generalities in his endeavour
to justify the new policy:
“We know that more and more of the world’s wealth is accumulating in the
hands of a very small minority—less than 1 percent. We know from the
Panama Papers and from Piketty’s book Capital in the Twenty-First Century
that many of these people pay low or no tax on their income overseas. In the
face of that reality, the Government has the right and the duty to protect their
local citizens from overseas accumulators of wealth impacting on the New
Zealand housing market. Therefore, this bill brings residential land within
the category of ‘sensitive land’ in the Overseas Investment Act.”
Gerry Brownlee MP (New Zealand National Party (National)) countered that
the data regarding foreign buyers did not justify the legislation. He pointed out
that statistics from Q3’17 show that only 3% of properties were owned by
foreigners, the vast majority of which are Australians (which the Act exempts).67
Even within Auckland, data from that quarter shows that 9.8% of transfers were
made to foreigners.68 Most recent data from Q4’18 shows that only 2.3% of home
transfers were made to non-residents or citizens.69 It is also alarming that Michael
Woodhouse MP (National) said that New Zealand First Party (NZ First) has
expressed negativity towards “Chinese-sounding surnames”70 in expressing their
desire to slash migration and prevent foreigners from buying houses. Stories of
wealthy Chinese “outbidding New Zealanders on suburban homes in Auckland”
may also smack of representative bias.71 Mercifully, the Forestry Minister Shane
Jones (NZ First) was candid enough to admit that the policy change was political
(rather than data-driven):
“But this bill will pass, and I just want to remind the House: where do we get
our mandate to make such a fundamental change towards property ownership
in New Zealand and the numbers of non-Kiwis holding such a privilege? We
fought an election on this particular issue.”72
66D. Parker, Overseas Investment Amendment Bill (First Reading), Hansard, 19 December 2017 at https://www
.parliament.nz/en/pb/hansard-debates/rhr/combined/HansDeb_20171219_20171219_16 [Accessed 14 November
2019].
67G. Brownlee,Overseas Investment Amendment Bill (First Reading), Hansard, 19 December 2017 at https://www
.parliament.nz/en/pb/hansard-debates/rhr/combined/HansDeb_20171219_20171219_16 [Accessed 14 November
2019].
68Stats NZ, One in 19 inner city Auckland home transfers go to overseas people (30 October 2018) at https://www
.stats.govt.nz/news/one-in-10-inner-city-auckland-home-transfers-go-to-overseas-people [Accessed 14 November
2019].
69 Stats NZ, Overseas home buyers’ share relatively unchanged in December quarter (8 February 2019) at https:
//www.stats.govt.nz/news/overseas-home-buyers-share-relatively-unchanged-in-december-quarter [Accessed 14
November 2019].
70M. Woodhouse, Overseas Investment Amendment Bill (First Reading), Hansard, 19 December 2017 at https:/
/www.parliament.nz/en/pb/hansard-debates/rhr/combined/HansDeb_20171219_20171219_16 [Accessed 14November
2019].
71N. Perry, “New Zealand bans most foreigners from buying homes” (AP, 15 August 2018) at https://www.apnews
.com/cb80e520c0e045da9e129302256dca97 [Accessed 14 November 2019].
72 S. Jones, Overseas Investment Amendment Bill (First Reading), Hansard, 19 December 2017 at https://www
.parliament.nz/en/pb/hansard-debates/rhr/combined/HansDeb_20171219_20171219_16 [Accessed 14 November
2019].
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Even apart from the opposition, there were several quarters who found the
legislative amendments ill-conceived. In December 2017, New Zealand’s own
Treasury released a Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA)73 on the intended Bill
to Cabinet. The RIA observed several problems, including:
• “the nature of the [intended] benefits is unclear as it is difficult to
assess the extent and nature of the behavioural responses that will
result from the policy”;
• “there is lack of empirical data on current levels of overseas
investment in the housing market”;
• “some of the design choices may be sub-optimal or have unintended
consequences”.
In April 2018, the InternationalMonetary Fund (IMF) also expressed reservations
about New Zealand’s general ban on foreign ownership. The IMF noted that “a
ban of residential real estate purchases by non-residents is unlikely to have a
significant impact on housing affordability” and further, that “foreign buyers seem
to have played a minor role in New Zealand’s residential real estate markets
recently”.74 In a radio interview relating to the report, the IMF’s Mission Chief for
Australia and New Zealand Thomas Helbling said that putting capital flow controls
were only appropriate when they were “very large, disruptive inflows of money”.
Helbling also opined that “when you look at the statistic for New Zealand as a
whole, and even Auckland as a whole, the role of foreign buyers is much less
prominent”.75
Canada
There are no legislative measures at the Canadian federal level restricting or
controlling foreign investment in residential property. The paper’s discussion on
Canada focuses on the two States which have introduced measures to tax foreign
buyers with additional acquisition tax; Ontario and British Columbia. While not
enacted yet, Quebec has recently published draft regulation suggesting that a tax
on non-resident purchasers may be imminent.76
DavidMcKay, the Chief Executive of the Royal Bank of Canada has commented
that foreign inflows are distorting Canada’s already constrained housing market
and that such investments are unproductive capital.77 While perhaps less glaring
than in Australia and New Zealand, public sentiment suggests that a goodmajority
of these foreign buyers originate from China and Greater China. As discussed
73The Treasury, “Regulatory Impact Assessment: Screening Overseas Investment in Sensitive Residential Land”
(11December 2017) at https://treasury.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2018-01/ria-tsy-srl-dec17.pdf [Accessed 14November
2019].
74 IMF, New Zealand: Staff Concluding Statement of the 2018 Article IV Mission (17 April 2018) at https://www
.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2018/04/16/ms041618-new-zealand-staff-concluding-statement-of-the-2018-article-iv
-mission [Accessed 14 November 2019].
75R. Stock, IMF not keen on proposed foreign buyer ban for houses (Stuff, 6 July 2018) at https://www.stuff.co.nz
/business/money/105284813/imf-not-keen-on-proposed-foreign-buyer-ban-for-houses [Accessed 14 November 2019].
76N. Cloutier, “Identification of non-resident purchaser’s in Quebec: will a new tax follow?” (McCarthy Tetrault,
15 February 2019) at https://www.mccarthy.ca/en/insights/blogs/lay-land/identification-non-resident-purchasers
-quebec-will-new-tax-follow [Accessed 14 November 2019].
77D. Alexander, RBC chief issues warning to foreign investors in Canadian real estate (Bloomberg, 6March 2018)
at https://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/rbc-chief-issues-warning-to-foreign-investors-in-canadian
-real-estate/article38218144/ [Accessed 14 November 2019].
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below, a less common narrative that should be noted is that Canada encouraged
such investments in the first place and could be a victim of its own success.
Educating Canadians on this could perhaps go some way to soothe some of the
anti-Sino sentiments which may have arisen in the first place.
Ontario
On 21 April 2017, the Ontario Government introduced several measures, including
rent control rules, to rein in the housing market. The measures appeared most
focused on the capital, Toronto, with the provincial government is also considering
implementing a vacancy tax for empty homes.
Most notable of the implementedmeasures was the imposition of a 15% transfer
tax on foreign buyers, pursuant to the Land Transfer Tax Act s.2.1.78As themarginal
transfer tax in Ontario is 2.5%,79 the total tax exposure for foreigners is 17.5%.
Dubbed the “non-resident speculation tax”, the tax applies to non-Canadian citizens
and non-residents (including non-Canadian companies and taxable trusts) who
purchase residential property in the Greater Golden Horseshoe Region (GGH)80
in Southern Ontario.
The Land Transfer Tax Act s.1(1)(a) limits the application of the tax to residential
land that contains up to six “single family residences”. The Act defines single
family residences “as a unit or proposed unit under the Condominium Act 1998
or a structure or part of a structure that is designed for occupation as the residence
of a family”. The provision thus looks at how many single family residences are
contained on the residential land lot in question, imposing the tax on foreigners
buying single dwelling (stand-alone) property as well as condominium units that
contain up to six apartments. The non-resident speculation tax does not apply to
the purchase of a condominium unit in a building containing seven or more
dwellings.
Explaining the stated purpose behind the tax from the Government’s perspective,
Ontario’s Minister of Finance Charles Sousa (as he was then) said that the
non-resident speculation tax “is about discouraging those who are capitalising on
the speculation on homes, driving up prices, creating vacant homes and crowding
out families looking to buy”.81 Fellow liberal MPP82Yvan Baker similarly said that
the policy aims to “discourage those who have never even set foot in Ontario but
who are impacting a tight property market, creating vacant homes and contributing
to a speculative market”. Affordability was a key policy behind the legislative
change; Baker also stated that the people of Ontario should be able to enter the
property market without having to make undue sacrifices or taking on a huge
amount of risk.83At least at first glance, these policy motivations appear reasonable,
78Land Transfer Tax Act RSO 1990 c.L.6.
79 Pursuant to Land Transfer Tax Act RSO 1990 c.L.6 s.2(1), for properties above C$2M.
80The GGH region centres itself around Toronto. With a population close to 8 million people, the GGH region
accounts for approximately 20% of the population of Canada and close to 60% of the population of Ontario.
81Ch. Sousa, Orders of the Day—Time Allocation, Hansard, Legislative Assembly of Ontario, Session 41:2) 31
May 2017 at http://hansardindex.ontla.on.ca/hansardeissue/41-2/l088.htm [Accessed 14 November 2019].
82Ontario’s legislative assemblymen and women adopt the honorific of “members of the provincial parliament”
or MPP for short.
83Y. Baker, Budget Measures Act (Housing Price Stability and Ontario Seniors’ Public Transit Tax Credit)
(Hansard, Legislative Assembly of Ontario, Session 41:2) 30 May 2017 at http://hansardindex.ontla.on.ca
/hansardeissue/41-2/l087.htm [Accessed 14 November 2019].
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particularly because at the time the legislation was introduced, Toronto had
experienced a 33% y-o-y increase in residential prices.84Closer inspection, however,
suggests that there may be a disconnect between the alleged problem (foreign
speculators) and the legislative changes.
The first point is that there are several cogent allegations critical of the
policymaking process in respect of the non-resident speculation tax made by
opposition MPPs during the legislative assembly debates. Tellingly, these
allegations have all remained unrebutted,85 even though the Speaker of the House
granted airtime to Minister Charles Sousa, the main target of the criticism. During
the Bill’s technical briefing, then-oppositionMPP Peter Fedeli (Fedelie is Ontario’s
current Finance Minister, following the change of Ontario’s Government from
Liberal to Conservative in 2018) reported that senior civil servants from the
Ministry of Finance said there was no hard datawhy the Greater Golden Horseshoe
area was established as the relevant boundary affected by the tax, instead explaining
that it “was a political decision”, and further that the Ministry decided to follow
“the British Columbia model as we heard they did it in the greater Vancouver
area”.86 When probed further on the legislative justifications, Fedeli said that the
senior civil servants shared that the reason was simply that “the government felt
it had to do something”. Describing the legislation as an “ill-planned project”,
MPP Fedeli also noted the absence of a nexus between alleged policy problem
and policy goal given that there was “no credible data on foreign buyers in the
housing market”.87 At an earlier legislative assembly debate, Democratic MPP
Peter Tabuns similarly observed that the enactment of the non-resident speculation
tax by the Liberal Government was trying to score “cheap political points by talking
about foreign speculators”.88He noted that if preventing speculationwas the policy
goal, why were there no rules set in place to prevent speculation by locals. As
Toronto’s The Star noted sarcastically, “Foreign speculators be damned and banned.
Domestic speculators, mind you, can carry on as before”.89
The second point is that it is somewhat unclear why the non-resident speculation
tax is limited to residential land containing up to six single family residences. In
the entirety of Hansard proceedings concerning the Bill, this point was only
mentioned once,90 but none of the MPPs cite any reasons why the anti-speculation
tax is limited to the purchase of units in a building which contains six dwellings
or less. Could one reason be to limit the control of residential land lots by
foreigners? Probably not; there are no laws preventing a foreign investor from
purchasing all the units in say a seven-unit condominium (without any speculation
84Y. Baker, Budget Measures Act (Housing Price Stability and Ontario Seniors’ Public Transit Tax Credit)
(Hansard, Legislative Assembly of Ontario, Session 41:2) 30 May 2017.
85 Similar allegations critical of Finance Minister Charles Sousa have also been reported in Toronto’s The Star,
the newspaper with the largest circulation in Toronto. See M. Regg Cohn, “How Charles Sousa woke up from his
housing hibernation: Cohn” The Star 21 April 2017 at https://www.thestar.com/news/queenspark/2017/04/21/how
-charles-sousa-woke-up-from-his-housing-hibernation-cohn.html [Accessed 14 November 2019].
86V. Fedeli, Budget Measures Act (Housing Price Stability and Ontario Seniors’ Public Transit Tax Credit)
(Hansard, Legislative Assembly of Ontario, Session 41:2) 30 May 2017 at http://hansardindex.ontla.on.ca
/hansardeissue/41-2/l087.htm [Accessed 14 November 2019].
87V. Fedeli, Budget Measures Act (Housing Price Stability and Ontario Seniors’ Public Transit Tax Credit)
(Hansard, Legislative Assembly of Ontario, Session 41:2) 30 May 2017.
88 P. Tabuns, Housing Policy (Hansard, Legislative Assembly of Ontario, Session 41:2) 3 May 2017 at http:/
/hansardindex.ontla.on.ca/hansardeissue/41-2/l076.htm [Accessed 14 November 2019].
89M. Regg Cohn, “How Charles Sousa woke up from his housing hibernation: Cohn” The Star 21 April 2017.
90Y. Baker, Budget Measures Act (Housing Price Stability and Ontario Seniors’ Public Transit Tax Credit)
(Hansard, Legislative Assembly of Ontario, Session 41:2) 30 May 2017.
Politics and Policy 385
(2019) 83 Conv., Issue 3 © 2019 Thomson Reuters and Contributors
tax involved). Perhaps a better justification would be to encourage developers
from building apartment buildings with more than 6 dwellings – this serves the
twin purpose of increasing the supply of housing units while also making such
projects more attractive to foreign investors. Under Ontario’s Condominium Act
1998 s.82.1,91 a wholly owned or vastly majority-owned foreign condominium
building can be collectively redeveloped or sold by an 80% (as opposed to
unanimous) majority consent.92 In a comparative paper including Canada and
Australia, I had previously made suggestions how the collective sale process of
strata buildings could be improved.93 If increase in number of residential dwellings
is a policy goal, then one further amendment to the Ontario Act could be to
introduce a requirement to increase the number of dwellings following a collective
sale. Currently there is no requirement for this in all jurisdictions that allow a strata
sale by majority,94 despite the fact that many of these jurisdictions have a housing
supply issue.
One of the key criticisms about the way Ontario has dealt with the foreign buyers
tax is the paucity of data; this is reflected in the way the legislators endeavoured
to explain the tax in the provincial parliament. While it is known that Toronto is
very popular with Chinese buyers, it is not possible to conclude what relationship
if any, this has had on the enactment of the non-resident speculation tax.
Troublingly, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) recently reported that
the Ontario government has stopped publishing statistics on foreign buyers tax on
residential property, with the Finance Minister unable to explain why this is the
case.95
British Columbia
With an average house price to average annual income ratio of approximately 12,
Vancouver has been described as one of the least affordable places to live in the
developed world. This has resulted in ordinary residents of Vancouver, particularly
young workers, being forced to live far away from the metropolitan area. Gordon
notes that debt levels of first time buyers have surged while at the same time
communities are weakened by empty or under-used dwellings owned by
non-nationals.96 Gordon’s paper presents a comprehensive and persuasive report
which argues that Chinese investment is the primary reason for housing
unaffordability in Vancouver. In reaching this conclusion, he accounts and excludes
other possible reasons as the primary cause—low interest rates, desirability and
strength of the Vancouver economy, zoning and geographical limitations and
91Condominium Act 1998 SO 1998 c.19.
92This particular section allowing for a collective sale by 80%majority is legislated for but not in force yet, pending
proclamation by the Lieutenant Governor.
93E. Ti, “Collective Best Interests in Strata Collective sales” [December 2019 forthcoming] Australian Law Journal
at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3436526 [Accessed 14 November 2019].
94 In the context of Sydney, Sherry has expressed concern that there is no guarantee that the redeveloped site would
actually produce more homes as developers of luxury apartments may wish to reduce rather than increase density.
See C. Sherry, “Strata law overhaul a step too far” The Sydney Morning Herald 23 August 2015 at https://www.smh
.com.au/opinion/strata-law-overhaul-a-step-too-far-20150823-gj5mz5.html [Accessed 14 November 2019].
95M. Crawley, “Ontario’s foreign buyers tax figures are now a mystery—and the finance minister says he doesn’t
know why” CBC News 13 May 2019 at https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/doug-ford-ontario-foreign-buyers
-tax-real-estate-statistic-1.5131759 [Accessed 14 November 2019].
96 J. Gordon, Vancouver’s Housing Affordability Crisis: Causes, Consequences and Solutions Centre for Public
Policy Research, Simon Fraser University 2 May 2016.
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insufficient social housing.97 Elsewhere, Rose has also excluded the constrained
supply of housing units hypothesis as the cause of unaffordability; his research
similarly indicates that foreign speculators are driving prices up.98 While these
findings are persuasive, it is interesting to note that Canada may have been a victim
of its own success; Chinese investors were initially encouraged to invest in
Canadian cities.
Mike de Jong, then Finance Minister of British Columbia shared in July 2016
that more than 90% of foreign buyers are Chinese or Greater Chinese nationals.99
Similarly, the evidence presented by Ley also indicates that almost all of
Vancouver’s foreign investors are from Greater China (i.e. Hong Kong SAR),100
and that this stemmed from a series of “business immigration programs” starting
as early as 1978 established by the Canadian Government to encourage investment
in the country. Canada’s “investor stream”101 initiated in 1986 by the Mulroney
Government appears to have been at least partially opportunistic. The anticipated
return of Hong Kong to China in 1997 created uncertainties among many of the
wealthy in Hong Kong and the investment scheme allowing for migration captured
a sizeable segment of this group. These investor schemes no doubt snowballed
over the years, and it would be surprising if the presence of the early Chinese
investors did not encourage further Chinese settlement and investment in Canada.
Indeed since 2002, more than 60,000millionairemigrants and their familymembers
have settled in Vancouver.102
Notwithstanding that the Canadian governments’ own policies probably
precipitated housing unaffordability in its cities, regulatory measures to curb these
effects have been introduced. In February 2018, the Government of British
Columbia issued a Whitepaper listing a 30-point plan for housing affordability.103
In August 2016, the Government had earlier imposed an additional tax of 15% on
residential property transfers to foreign nationals.104 Effective 21 February 2018,
theWhitepaper led to this tax being increased to 20% for certain core central areas
in Vancouver.105 With a basic marginal transfer tax of 2%,106 this means that
foreigners buying residential property in British Columbia will have total transfer
tax liability of 17% or 22%. Another legislative reaction to curb foreign investment
97 J. Gordon, Vancouver’s Housing Affordability Crisis: Causes, Consequences and Solutions Centre for Public
Policy Research, Simon Fraser University 2 May 2016.
98 J. Rose, “The Housing Supply Myth” (Working Paper, 24 November 2017) at https://www.kpu.ca/sites/default
/files/The%20Housing%20Supply%20Myth%20Report%20John%20Rose.pdf [Accessed 14 November 2019].
99 J. Bruk, Canada’s housing crisis: The time for study has passed, The Globe and Mail 8 July 2016.
100D. Ley, “Global China and the making of Vancouver’s residential property market” (2017) 17(1) International
Journal of Housing Policy 15–34.
101Under this scheme, foreigners were granted residency in exchange for giving the Canadian Government a
five-year interest free loan of C$400,000, as well as having a net worth above C$800,000.
102 I. Young, “Foreign home buyers in Vancouver hit with HK-style 15pc tax, but millionaire migrants will be
exempt” (SCMP, 26 July 2016) at https://www.scmp.com/print/news/world/united-states-canada/article/1994773
/foreign-home-buyers-vancouver-hit-hk-style-15pc-tax [Accessed 14 November 2019].
103BCGovernment,Homes for BC, A 30-point plan for Housing Affordability in British Columbia (February 2018)
at https://www.bcbudget.gov.bc.ca/2018/homesbc/2018_homes_for_bc.pdf [Accessed 14 November 2019].
104 Property Transfer Tax Act (RSBC 1996) (Cap 378) s.2.01 adopts the definition of “foreign national” as stated
in the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act SC 2001 c.27 s.2(1) which states that “foreign national means a person
who is not a Canadian citizen or a permanent resident, and includes a stateless person”. This 15% additional tax was
imposed for transfers within the Metro Vancouver Regional District comprising most of the city.
105 Property Transfer Tax Act (RSBC 1996) (Cap 378) (the Act) s.2.02. Pursuant to s.3 of the Act, transfer taxes
to Canadian nationals or permanent residents are no more than 3% of the property’s value (1% of the first C$200,000,
2% for the next C$1.8M and 3% for amounts in excess of C$2M).
106 Property Transfer Tax Act (RSBC 1996) (Cap 378) s.3.01.
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was the introduction of a vacancy tax107 via the Vancouver Charter read with the
Vacancy Tax (Empty Homes Tax) Bylaw 11674.108 The rule requires Vancouver
city home owners to file an annual declaration on the occupancy status of their
residential home—owners who fail to file or declare a home empty pay a vacancy
tax of 1%109 of the property’s assessed taxable value.
Have these legislative reactions been successful in achieving their stated policy
aim of achieving housing affordability? A preliminary assessment would suggest
at least some success in this respect. In July 2017, a year after the 15% additional
property transfer tax was imposed, the Real Estate Board of Greater Vancouver
reported that price growth declined while volume of sales dropped across all
segments of the housing market.110
In Vancouver, the additional transfer tax applied to transfers to “foreign
nationals” excludes permanent residents of Canada, regardless of nationality. The
policy has thus been criticised by focusing on whether a buyer was foreign or
non-resident instead of whether the money came from overseas, thus downplaying
the impact of foreign capital.111 There are perhaps two ways this policy be tweaked.
First, as Gordon has suggested, the emphasis should be on limiting the impact of
foreign capital brought into Canada by permanent residents, i.e. the additional
transfer tax should also apply to such buyers. This could limit the possibility of
foreign buyers using permanent residents as the registered owners to hold the
property on trust for them. A second possibility would be to adopt a more restrictive
definition of a “local”, being limited to Canadian citizens only.
Regulation and property rights
Globalisation has led to foreign liquidity playing an increasingly important role
in shaping property markets.112 In all cities, housing scarcity can be a sensitive
policy issue when local residents feel outpriced. The tension between attracting
capital to a city and its affordability is one which all major cities have to grapple
with. The effects of legislation meant to curb foreign investment and thereby
increase affordability are, like all policy tools, not always easy to measure, and a
robust, long-term quantitative analysis is needed at a city-level to examine the
cost-benefits of a policy, including excluding spuriousness. While politicians may
be quick to claim credit when changes in law or policy result in lower prices and
hence “affordability”, unintended ancillary effects must also be considered to avoid
only superficial analysis. Apart from Vancouver the rest of the jurisdictions
surveyed in this paper do not show a robust, data-driven relationship to justify the
policy of enacting additional acquisition tax for foreigners. The emotive and
sometimes dramatic language used by lawmakers suggests that in general, politics
107Vancouver Charter (SBC 1953) (Cap 55) Pt XXX. Under r.2.3, Bylaw, a property is deemed vacant if it is left
unoccupied for six months during the vacancy reference period.
108 See https://bylaws.vancouver.ca/11674c.PDF [Accessed 14 November 2019].
109Bylaw r.2.4. Failure to pay the 1% vacancy tax attracts a 5% penalty: Bylaw r.2.7.
110A year following the introduction of the 15% additional property transfer tax, Vancouver’s composite benchmark
of house prices still rose 8.7% but volume declined by 8.2% y-o-y.
111 I. Young, “Foreign home buyers in Vancouver hit with HK-style 15pc tax, but millionaire migrants will be
exempt” (SCMP, 26 July 2016).
112L. Wen-Chi, “Foreign liquidity to real estate market: Ripple effect and housing price dynamics” (2015) 52(1)
Urban Studies 138, 154.
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has trumped good policy making. Perhaps one exception is Queensland, which
acknowledged that the purpose of its tax is to help first-time homebuyers.
Of course, politicians may not necessarily routinely make sound policy and
legislative changes based on hard data. Where property is concerned however,
perhaps one should expect, if not hope, for very cogent reasons when rights are
affected. It should be recognised that any change in policy affecting the transfer
of property amounts to a certain extent, imposition of property itself. From an
economic perspective, property is a bundle of rights, though all governments
impose regulations limiting what can be done to or on land.113 Notwithstanding,
as property tax rates increase, the logical conclusion is that regulation shades into
appropriation of property at a certain point. Sometimes governments realise this
and have to make reversals of policy. For instance, Sri Lanka imposed in 2004, a
100% tax on foreigners buying property in the country, citing fears of foreigners
buying up prime beachfront hotels and bungalows. In 2011, on the basis to “promote
foreign investment and tourism”, the tax was scrapped.114No doubt, the imposition
of punitive transfer taxes distorts the free market. Property prices are determined
by the interaction of supply and demand in the market, with the price mechanism
operating to return supply and demand to a state of equilibrium.115Ball, Lizieri and
MacGregor find that, for equilibrium to be feasible, “buyers and sellers must be
able to use the full available information when making their decisions and operate
according to the arguments of their demand and supply schedules”.116 As
Rapaczynski notes, the biggest threat to private property rights is often the State
itself.117
Conclusion
From a macroeconomic perspective, the policy responses by the jurisdictions
surveyed do not appear unreasonable: China is the largest international property
investor in the world, having grown about 25-fold from 2010–2017 alone. This
paper however does not argue that Chinese investors are never the cause of housing
affordability issues. The point made is that if a particular nationality is specifically
highlighted by a country’s lawmakers to justify the enactment of a law, there ought
to be specific data or evidence to back this up.
In four out of six of the surveyed jurisdictions (Victoria, New South Wales,
New Zealand and Toronto), comments by parliamentarians suggest that it is the
mere belief that Chinese investors affect housing affordability that precipitated
legislative change, despite no or even opposing data shown. Unhelpful, sensational
headlines such as “Country is at risk of becoming the 24th province of China”118
113E. Ti, “Compensating regulation of land: UK and Singapore compared” (2019) 11(2) Journal of Property,
Planning and Environmental Law 135–50.
114B. Sirimanna, “100% land sale tax for foreigners to be scrapped” Business Times 18 September 2011 at http:/
/www.sundaytimes.lk/110918/BusinessTimes/bt01.html [Accessed 14 November 2019].
115D. Adams, N. Dunse and M. White, “Conceptualising State-Market Relations in Land and Property: The
Mainstream Contribution of Neo-Classical and Welfare Economics” in D. Adams, C. Watkins and M. White (eds),
Planning, Public Policy & Property Markets (Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 19.
116M. Ball, C. Lizieri and B. MacGregor, The Economics of Commercial Property Markets (Routledge, 1998), 63.
117A. Rapaczynski, “The Roles of the State and the Market in Establishing Property Rights” (1996) 10(2) Journal
of Economic Perspectives 87, 92.
118A. Carey, “Fears one million Aussie homes could soon be owned by foreign buyers” news.com.au 16 February
2019 at https://www.news.com.au/finance/real-estate/buying/fears-one-million-aussie-homes-could-soon-be-owned
-by-foreign-buyers/news-story/c50a4112bab4f3ed8fae27277f313f54 [Accessed 14 November 2019].
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are seen in major newspapers, often times with limited analysis on whether the
underlying causal relationship is shown.
Housing policy is deeply complex, and this paper does not suggest that
jurisdictions should not have the liberty to impose enhanced taxation on foreigners.
Indeed, it is conceded that foreign buyers (including the Chinese) may leave their
investment homes empty and unused homes certainly do not benefit a city’s
flourishing. A vacancy tax that applies uniformly to all owners but has a greater
effect on foreign buyers appears to be more palatable than one that specifically
targets foreigners. Respectfully, I would suggest that regulations targeting foreigners
should be minimally backed by data. Local residents concerned about Chinese
buyers should not be advised to “simply get over it”119—advice which implicitly
assumes that Chinese buyers have in the first place, been the cause of housing
unaffordability. As an Australian MP wisely observed, allowing anti-foreigner
sentiment to fester has the potential to disintegrate social fabric.120Hansard records
of the State of Victoria state that the only purpose of the additional transfer tax on
foreigners is to fund help-to-buy housing policies. This is far healthier than
politicians who permit, or worse, encourage beliefs relating to Chinese buyers
which is not positively borne out by the data.
Appendix
YearDetails of MeasureJurisdiction
2017Annual vacancy tax (A$5000)Australia (Federal)
FIRB application + fees
Foreigners limited to buying new homes
20198% foreigner stamp dutyVictoria
20182% Absentee land tax
20178% foreigner stamp duty + 2% annual foreign
owner land tax
New South Wales
20187% additional foreigner acquirer dutyQueensland
20187% foreigner ownership surchargeSouth Australia
20183% foreign investor duty surchargeTasmania
20197% foreign buyer’s dutyWestern Australia
August 2018Foreign nationals (excepting NZ permanent
residents, Australian citizens& PRs and Singa-
New Zealand (Country wide)
pore citizens & PRs) are not permitted to buy
residential real estate, exception is off-plan
condominiums with more than 20 units
2017/201815% foreigner transfer tax in most parts of +
20% foreigner transfer tax in core central parts
British Columbia
119B. Brook, “Get over it: Bob Carr’s advice to prospective homeowners concerned about Chinese buyers”
news.com.au 5 July 2019 at https://www.news.com.au/finance/economy/get-over-it-bob-carrs-advice-to-prospective
-homeowners-concerned-about-chinese-buyers/news-story/b9f053eb0bd99e20412a2b628133bb87 [Accessed 14
November 2019].
120 J. ClareMP,Ministerial Statements—Investment Statement 2018 (Hansard, House of Representatives, 20 August
2018) at https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Hansard/Hansard_Display?bid=chamber/hansardr
/66d5616d-41f7-432b-b370-a62012124e44/&sid=0194 [Accessed 14 November 2019].
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YearDetails of MeasureJurisdiction
1% vacancy tax
201715% foreigner transfer tax applicable to
dwellings purchasedwithin the Greater Golden
Ontario
Horseshoe on residential land containing 1-6
single residential homes
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